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From Special Privilege to Social Rights

Universalism in Social Policy

On March n, 2008, Chile's Socialist President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010)
signed an important piece of legislation into law. Law 20.2 5 5 reformed the
country's pension system, introducing a solidaristic pillar that guaranteed a
state-funded minimum or supplementary pension to the bottom 60 percent of
income earners. The new law represented one of the most significant advancements in recent history for the social rights of Chile's low-income workers,
rural sector inhabitants, and women, granting them access to a basic minimum
income in their old age. Moreover, the reform was fully funded, ensuring that
the state could maintain the commitment for years to come. Indeed, as President
Bachelet put it herself, "The truth is that it would have been easy to engage in
populist politics at the cost of the dreams of our seniors. We, however, did not
fall victim to this temptation. We opted, instead, to guarantee social rights"
(Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile 2008, 3362, italics and translation
by author). Although Chile was able to integrate greater universalism into the
pension system, the same was not true for family assistance and education
policy, where reforms enacted during the r99os and early 2000s did little to
eliminate existing inequalities.
During this same time period, just over the Cordillera de los Andes,
Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez (2005-2010) was also engaged in a
sweeping effort to reconfigure that country's social protection system. After
just two years in office, the Frente Amplio (FA) administration had passed
a wide-reaching health care reform that expanded coverage among children
and strengthened the public sector. The left/center-left government also unified Uruguay's family allowance system, equalizing the benefits for formal and
informal sector workers and providing income support to the bottom half of
the income distribution. Still, the first Frente Amplio administration finished
its term in office without having made a significant change to education policy.

I
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Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America

The Chilean and Uruguayan reforms marked a new direction in social policy,
placing an emphasis on universalism and on the provision of benefits as a r~ght
of citizenship. This focus, however, was not integral to the policy initiauves
carried out by all of Latin America's left-leaning governments during the early
2000s. Indeed, in 2003, Venezuela's leftist president, Hugo Chavez (1999present), began to construct an entirely new social welfare system alongside
the existing state infrastructure. Chavez's initiatives, known as the Bolivarian
missions, aimed at improving access to select education and health services as
well as providing targeted income transfers, but the initiatives did not gene~ally represent a move toward universalism in social protection. Similarly, Ill
Argentina, the Peronist Party (PJ) administrations of President Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) and President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-present)
enacted some reforms that moved toward greater universalism, such as the 20° 8
nationalization of the pension system and the 2009 universal child allowance,
but the initiatives lacked a stable funding source and the country's progress
was generally slower than that seen in Chile and Uruguay.
The events in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela underscore several
puzzling questions. First, why did these four countries - all headed by parties
of the left/center-left, 1 with similar levels of development, democratic politics,
and high exposure to international markets - pursue different reforms? Why
did President Bachelet choose to maintain a private pension system, but add to
it a citizenship-based flat-rate benefit, whereas Argentina opted to return to a
state-run contributory system? Why did Chile create a new pension system, but
leave family assistance virtually untouched? Why did Uruguay's FA successfully
reform health care and family assistance programs, but fail with regard to
education policy? More broadly, what does this series of reforms suggest about
Latin America's left-leaning political parties and the ability of the "left turn"
to produce meaningful changes in poverty and inequality? 2

' I recognize that Venezuela's Socialist Party (PSUV) is located significantly further to the left
than Chile's Concertaci6n parties or the FA, but differentiating between left, center-left, cen·
ter, center-right, and right would create an unwieldy typology with sixteen separate categories.
Therefore, I choose to combine all left-leaning parties into one category of left/center-left and
all right-leaning parties into a similar category of right/center-right. I also realize that catego·
rizing the PJ as a left/center-left organization is controversial because the party includes some
right-wing politicians and supporters. Although it is true that the party's ideology has fluctu·
ated across time, many scholars have classified the PJ as left/center-left during the Kirchner
years. For examples of such work, see: Levitsky and Murillo ( 2oo8)· Huber and Stephens
(20~2); _Niedzwiecki (2010); Levitsky and Roberts (20rr); Etchemendy and Garay (20II_);
Schipam (2012); and Ostiguy (2009). I discuss the classification of the PJ in greater depth 111
Chapter 7.
2
The "left turn" refers to the first decade of the twenty-first century, when ten Latin American
state~ elected left-leaning executives. These countries were: Argentina ( 2003 , 20 07, and 20II),
Brazil (2002, 2006, and 20Io), Bolivia (2005 and 2009), Chile (2ooo and 2oo6), Ecuador (2006
and 2009), El Salvador (2009), Nicaragua (2006), Paraguay (2008), Uruguay (2 004 and 201°),
and Venezuela ( I998, 2000, and 2006).
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This book seeks to answer these questions, presenting a new theory about
the role of policy legacies, electoral competition, and political parties in shaping
social welfare policies. In particular, I argue that policy legacies influence social
policy reform by structuring the kinds of policy adjustments that are needed,
and by empowering some organizations while weakening others. In addition, I
contend that electoral competition influences reform initiatives because parties
that face a strong opposition are more likely to engage in universalistic reforms.
Finally, I find evidence that the character of political parties, which I define
as the combination of ideology, internal organization, and external linkage
mechanism, has a profound effect on the nature of social policy reform. In
particular, I find that two types of left/center-left parties, those which I identify
as electoral-professional and constituency-coordinating, have made progress
toward universalism in social policy, while a third type, which I classify as
non-programmatic-electoral, has enjoyed less success,3 Thus, the theoretical
framework developed in Chapter 2 sheds light on the question of why parties
with a similar ideological orientation sometimes pursue different social policy
reforms and what such variation means for the ability of Latin American states
to build sustainable and equitable systems of social protection. It, therefore,
contributes a new perspective that builds on and refines extant theories of
welfare state development. The book also contributes to the growing literature
on Latin America's left turn, presenting a new classification of parties that
helps explain the high levels of heterogeneity among the region's left-leaning
governments.

Equitableand SustainableSocial Policy: Latin America'sDilemma
The goal of building equitable and sustainable social policies is a challenge
faced by countries around the world. While most states provide some form of
social protection, the way such programs are financed, designed, and administered varies significantly and these differences have consequences for the
well-being of individuals and families. By the mid-to-late twentieth century,
a handful of Latin American countries had developed advanced social protection systems rooted in the Bismarckian social insurance tradition (Huber
1996; Pribble 20rr; Dion 2010; Filgueira and Filgueira 1997; Haggard and
Kaufman 2008). In these countries, social expenditure constituted a sizable
share of state outlays, but a large portion of the population remained excluded
from the programs. Moreover, the quality of social services and the size of transfer payments in Latin America's advanced social protection states remained,
for the most part, highly stratified across income and occupational categories,
deepening inequality in the region. This is likely because Latin Ameri~an social
protection generally developed in a manner that favored the urban middle and
working classes (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, 79-rr3).
3

These party types are discussed in detail in Chapter

2•
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The inability of Latin America's advanced social protection systems to provide adequate coverage and reduce inequality results from a mismatch be_twe~n
the structure of the region's labor market and the design of social pol~cy. n
advanced industrialized democracies, welfare regimes grounded in the Bism_arckian tradition of contributory social insurance have been effective at prot~cu~g
the bulk of the population, albeit in a more inegalitarian manner than JO t. e
Nordic regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001). In Lat~n
America, however, where a large share of the population works outside t e
formal labor market, such systems inevitably generate coverage gaps and_exa~erbate inequality. The presence of informal workers has historic roots JO t e
region, but this sector has grown precipitously since the decline of import
substitution industrialization (ISI), and by the late 1990s, anywhere from
30 percent to 40 percent of workers in Latin America's advanced social protection states operated in the informal sector (Portes and Hoffman 2003, s2 l•
Because informal-sector workers do not pay payroll taxes, they lack access/~
contributory-based benefits such as pensions, family allowances, and hea t
insurance. Furthermore, because salaries in the informal sector are on average
5
lower, and the employment more precarious, it is precisely the poorest se~t?1
of society that are excluded from such programs, thus widening the divI e
between rich and poor.
This disconnect between the socio-structural reality of Latin America's la~or
market, namely that it is characterized by a large informal sector, and the desig~
of social protection systems, which are based on formal employment, create
a paradoxical situation for the region's advanced social protection states a~
the turn of the twenty-first century: while the countries were heavily invested
in social programs, the very neediest sectors of society were often exclude
from policies. 4 Figure I.I presents the difference in levels of pension cover~ge
between the top and bottom income quintiles among the economically acuve
population in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela.5 As illustrated by t~e
figure, low-income workers affiliate with the pension systems in these countnes
at a much lower rate than workers in the top income quintile. Moreov~r, ~h~
figure reveals that this coverage gap grew between 1992 and 2006. A sim~la
trend is evident in Figure 1.2, which depicts the difference in levels of penswn
coverage between the top and bottom income quintiles among the elderl_y
population during the 1990s and 2000s. 6 With the exception of Uruguay, this
4

5

6

Esping-Andersen (2002) and Filgueira (2006) both make a similar diagnosis about the disjuncrure
between new risk structures and old social welfare architecture.
The data used to calculate the difference are taken from Rofman, Lucchetti, and Ourens (2008 •
High values represent a large coverage gap, whereas small values signify that coverage
32-119).
is relatively similar between the upper and lower income quintiles.
In both Figures r.r and r.2, I dropped the observation for Venezuela in 2001 because of concern
that the figure was incorrect. Reported coverage of pensions among the elderly population in th e
bottom income quintile increased by fifteen percentage points in 2001 and then fell by sixteen
points in 2002 (Rofman, Lucchetti, and Ourens 2008, u7).
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difference was generally greater than twenty percentage points and increased
steadily throughout the 1990s and 2000s.
The fact that pension coverage among the poorest workers and senior citizens was anywhere from ten to sixty points lower than that of the top income
quintile provides evidence of the inability of Latin America's social protection
systems to adequately reach excluded sectors. By the late 1990s, a confluence
of factors, including growing electoral pressure, international attention, and
improved economic growth, facilitated a series of social policy reforms aimed
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I
___\ '~·
__
,,,__,_..,_

,,,,..,,.---,1

--✓

0

1995

1990

2000

2005

Year

---

Argentina

- --

- - -·-

Uruguay

-

-

- - Chile
-

Venezuela

FIGURE r. 2 . Difference between Top and Bottom Income Quintiles' Pension Coverage (Elderly Population). Source: Author's calculation based on data from Rofman,
Lucchetti, and Ourens (2008).

Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America

6

Ideal
'universal'
welfare state

Universal

1

2

High
(sustainable)
expenditure

Low
expenditure

4

3

Segmented

FIGURE

1.3. Categories of Social Protection.

at expanding coverage and reducing the stratification of benefits. The drive
toward such reforms, however, has been a difficult one, as policy makers face a
significant challenge: how to expand coverage and improve quality in a fi~c~lly
sustainable manner. Achieving this goal often involves reallocating existing
expenditure in addition to increasing spending - a politically charged task. .
Figure r.3 provides a visual account of the political dilemma faced by Laun
America's advanced social protection states. In the figure, the x-axis represents
the levels of spending on social welfare programs, ranging from limited funding
to high but sustainable spending. The y-axis represents the nature of benefits,
ranging from segmented (with only small sectors receiving highly unequal benefits) to universal access and benefit levels. Using this typology, I identify four
basic types of welfare provision: (r) underfunded but semi-universal systems;
(2) high and sustainable funding and universal to semi-universal systems; (3)
highly funded but segmented systems; and (4) low-spending and segmented
systems. By the end of the twentieth century, Latin America's advanced social
protection states would have been located somewhere in quadrants three or
four, and therefore faced one of two challenges: (r) to expand spending and
universalism (moving from quadrant four to quadrant two) or (2) to reform the
allocation of funds in order to increase universalism (moving from quadrant
three to quadrant two).
Clearly these two processes involve very different political calculations. Still,
a general puzzle arises: what are the factors that explain a country's decision to
move toward a more universal system of social protection? This book explores
this question through a comparative analysis of Chile and Uruguay with a
secondary focus on Argentina and Venezuela, concluding that the design of
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previous policies, electoral competition, and the character of political parties
influenced social policy reforms in all four countries.
The issue of why some Latin American states have been more successful
than others at reforming social protection systems in a manner that expands
the coverage and quality of benefits for all citizens has not been fully explored
by scholars of comparative politics. Indeed, extant research has generally
focused on the determinants of spending levels (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens
2008; Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001), the historical origins of policies (Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Haggard and Kaufman 2oo8;
Dion 20ro; Pribble 2011; Huber 1996; Filgueira 2005; Martfnez Franzoni and
Sanchez-Ancochea 2012), and the determinants of liberalizing reforms during
the 1980s and 1990s (Dion 20ro; Castiglioni 2005a; Weyland 1996; Kaufman
and Nelson 2004a; Brooks 2009; Madrid 2003; Nelson 1999; Grindle 2004a).
Beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Latin American states began to
expand social expenditures, but the character of these new policy initiatives
varied across countries and across policy sectors, and very little scholarship
has contemplated the question of why such divergence exists.? In particular,
the issue of why some countries have moved their social protection systems in
the direction of greater universalism, whereas others have carried out reforms
that deepen segmentation, has not been fully explored. This question is pressing
in both political and practical terms, as it provides insight into the potential
paths that lead to more universal social policy, which is crucial for reducing
poverty and addressing Latin America's high levels of income inequality.
Defining Universalism in Latin America

Studies of social welfare policy often use spending levels as a proxy for the
relative size and strength of social protection programs. General expenditure
figures, however, are misleading in the Latin American context because they
do not permit an analysis of who receives benefits and of stratification in the
quality of services and generosity of transfers. Moreover, while state expenditure is a crucial component of social protection, other aspects of public policy,
namely regulatory standards and the design of financing mechanisms, also have
important implications for the universality and quality of welfare policies.
Clearly, then, an analysis concerned with the ability of La tin American states
to build more inclusive and universal social protection systems cannot rely
solely on expenditure data. For this reason, this book develops and analyzes
a new dependent variable: universalism. Universalism refers to social policies
that guarantee coverage for a set of essential social services (preschool, primary,
and secondary education as well as health care) and ensure a basic minimum
income during the working years and after exiting the labor market because
7 Research that does consider this period includes: Castiglioni (2010); Dion (2010); Huber and
Stephens (2012); and Ewig and Kay (20u).
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of old age, sickness, or unemployment. 8 In this way, the concept of unive:·
salism recognizes the important role of state-provided social spending, but is
simultaneously concerned with the question of whether this spending reaches
marginalized populations. The concept builds on and expands the notion of
basic universalism, which Filgueira et al. (2006) define as a system of social
protection that guarantees coverage for all citizens for a group of essential
services and transfers. In such a system, the state plays a central role in the
provision of benefits, but also in ensuring that all individuals can access and
effectively use the services and transfers. Examples of basic universal welfare
policies include a flat-rate citizenship pension, a guaranteed minimum citizenship income, a public preschool system, and state guarantees to cover a group
of health risks (Filgueira et al. 2006, 40-5 5). My definition of universalism
goes one step further, contemplating to what extent social policies improve the
quality of services and the size of transfer payments, as well as whether the
financing of such programs is fiscally sustainable.
To assess the character of social policy reforms in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay,
and Venezuela, I evaluate policies along four dimensions: (r) To what extent
does the new policy universalize coverage? (2) To what extent are policies
administered in a transparent (rather than discretionary) manner? (3) To what
extent do policies ensure quality public services or reduce segmentation in th_e
size of income transfers? (4) To what extent is the financing mechanism equitable and sustainable? Using these dimensions, I rank each social policy reform
as "pure universalism," "advanced universalism," "moderate universalism,"
"weak universalism," "neutral," "regressive," or "failed reform."
This conceptualization differs from existing definitions of universalism,
which are rooted in the experience of advanced industrialized democracies.
In that context, a universal system is one in which all citizens have access to
social services of a similarly high quality and receive generous income transfers.
In the context of contemporary Latin America, the consolidation of such a welfare state is highly unlikely in the short-to-medium term. Still, some countries
in the region have begun to create programs that expand coverage, equalize
benefit levels, and narrow the gap in the quality of public services. Additio?ally, some states have started to ensure that access to benefits is defined 1ll
legal terms, avoiding political manipulation, and a handful of states have taken
great care to construct a sustainable funding source for new policies. I contend that such progress constitutes a move toward universalism and warrants
investigation, and therefore, I create a measure that allows for an assessment
of degrees of progress. Whereas a binary conceptualization of universalism
would reveal no variation across Latin America, my measure provides insight
into important differences that exist between states in the region with regard
8

Other policies such as public provision of family planning, water, sanitation, and electricity are
also of great importance to low-income families. Because of space constraints, I choose to focus
on the traditional areas of welfare state policy.
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to the design of recent social policy reforms. Thus, although different from the
traditional understanding of universalism, this measure is useful. Moreover,
the dimensions identified in the measure provide insight into the fundamental
question of whether or not all citizens receive relatively equal welfare benefits.
Indeed, if a country provides quality public services and income transfers that
are of a similar size to 100 percent of the population, then it seems safe to call
the welfare state universal, regardless of whether or not the system is unified.
I also include a dimension related to the administration of benefits and to the
sustainability of funding because historically in Latin America, clientelism and
boom-bust spending cycles have undermined the ability of states to guarantee
a minimum level of social protection.
Using this new measure, reforms that achieve "pure universalism" are characterized by 100 percent coverage and benefits that are granted in a transparent
manner. The policy initiatives promote similarly sized transfer payments and
quality public services. Finally, the programs are financed in an equitable and
sustainable manner. None of the countries included in this study achieved "pure
universalism," but Chile and Uruguay both carried out "advanced" reforms in
the domains of health care and noncontributory social assistance. "Advanced"
reforms increase coverage, ensuring access for at least the bottom 50 percent
of the income distribution, and they administer benefits in a legally defined
and transparent manner so as to minimize political manipulation. Moreover,
"advanced" reforms include mechanisms aimed at standardizing the size of
transfer payments and the quality of social services, but often fall short of
obtaining full equality because of low levels of spending. These funding constraints are generated by the fact that the financial base of "advanced" reforms,
while more equitable and sustainable than in previous periods, remains imperfect. The third category of reforms exhibits improvement on three dimensions of the measure but fails to make progress on one dimension. Argentina's
2006 education reform falls into this "moderate" category. The fourth type
of social policy reform is classified as "weak universalism," which means the
reform advanced on two of the four dimensions of universalism. Several of
Argentina's initiatives during the early 2000s are classified as "weak," as is the
199 5 Chilean education reform, which increased coverage but failed to ensure
a quality education for all children and exacerbated the equity of financing.
The fifth category of the dependent variable is "neutral" and describes initiatives that failed to produce any substantial change in at least three of the
four dimensions of universalism. Venezuela carried out four neutral reforms
to social assistance policy during the early 2000s, administering services in a
transparent manner but failing to improve coverage, transfer size, and funding
sustainability. Finally, "regressive reforms" are those that exacerbate problems
of coverage, inequality, and financing, while "failed reform" occurs in systems
in which no change was enacted. Argentina's health and pension reforms during the administration of President Carlos Menem (1989-1999) are examples
of regressive reforms because they decreased coverage and increased benefit

IO
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segmentation. An example of failed reform was also witnessed in Argentina,
where President Menem was unable to alter the country's health care system for
retirees. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7 present an in-depth discussion of my codin? of
education, health, and noncontributory social assistance reforms in Argentina,
Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, but the standards that I use for scoring the
legislation are summarized in Table 1.1.
Before advancing further, it is important to clearly define the four dimensions of this measure of universalism. In the context of advanced industrialized
democracies, universalism is associated with the Nordic welfare regimes and is
defined as a system that provides generous benefits to all citizens, regardless of
income, labor market status, or sex. In these universalistic welfare states, benefits are coupled with high tax rates, and therefore, the transfers and services
consumed by high-income earners are recovered by the state through income
taxes. In Latin America, by contrast, tax systems are notoriously weak, and
therefore, the process of "universalism" cannot be expected to work in an id~ntical manner. For this reason, I contend that social policy reforms that provide
automatic access to benefits (without discretionary criteria) to at least the bo_ttom 50 percent of the income distribution should be considered as moving in
a universal direction (advanced universalism). Thus, the further a state moves
past 50 percent coverage, the stronger the trend toward universalism. Still, it
is important to consider not only how broad coverage is, but also how that
coverage is obtained, namely what criteria are used to identify beneficiaries.
This is because in universal welfare states, benefits are granted as a legally
defined right, which eliminates the possibility of using political criteria to favor
some individuals and exclude others. Thus, I contend that in order for a state
to qualify as having "advanced universalism," benefits must cover at least the
bottom 50 percent of the income distribution and that access must be based
on transparent and clearly defined criteria, not discretionary factors such as
political favoritism.
This measure of universalism also considers whether policies improve the
quality of social services and the size of income transfers. In this way, I contend that policies should be considered fully universal if they guarantee that:
( 1) individuals using the public health system receive quality care for a set
of fundamental services, (2) that children enrolled in public education receive
quality schooling, and (3) that noncontributory transfer payments are generous, thereby reducing benefit segmentation between formal and informal sector
workers. 9 This study also considers whether the financing of social programs
is equitable, namely whether it eases the burden on the poorest sectors of
society, and if the funding is sustainable. By sustainable financing, I refer to
9

Employees and employers pay into the contributory system, so it stands to reason that those benefits will be larger than noncontributory income transfers, which are financed through general
revenue. Still, the size of this gap can be narrowed if the state invests heavily in the noncontributory system.

TABLE

r.r.

Categories and Scoring of Universalism
Pure
Universalism

Advanced
Universalism

Achieves universal
coverage

Ioo¾ universal

Character of policy
implementation
(transparent vs.
discretionary)

Automatic right
of all citizens

Increased coverage,
arriving at more
than 50%
Transparent
Provoked
provision to a large
change on
segment (more
three
than 50%) of
dimensions
population. This
group is clearly
defined in legal
terms, and political
manipulation is not
present.
Improvement, albeit
imperfect

Ensures quality
services and
reduces
segmentation in
benefit generosity

Yes

Equitable and
sustainable
financing

Broad
progressive
financing
system

Improved financing,
albeit imperfect

Moderate
Universalism

Weak
Universalism

Provoked
change on
two
dimensions

Neutral

Regressive Reform

Failed
Reform

Reform exacerbates No reform
coverage
adopted
problems
No reform
No change or Granted in a
particularistic and
adopted
change on
nontransparent
only one
dimension
manner. Political
manipulation is
possible or
present.

Reform exacerbates
inequality in
services and
transfers

No reform
adopted

Reform undermines
financing

No reform
adopted
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policy reforms that are tied to a steady revenue source. Using these defini~ion_s,
I evaluate reforms to health care, social assistance, and education policy in
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 7, based on how far each initiative moved in the direction
of universalism. ro
The Argument

The role of left parties in building and expanding universal welfare sra:es
in advanced industrialized democracies has been confirmed by an extensive
body of research (Hicks 1999; Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens
2001; Korpi 1989). In the context of contemporary Latin America, b~ c~ntrast, many scholars have argued that ideological divisions have been sigmficantly weakened by the constraints imposed by economic liberalization a nd
globalization (Weyland 2004a; Madrid 2003; Brooks 2009; Kaufman a nd
Nelson 20046). Still, other studies have uncovered important differences in the
character of regulatory, labor, and social policies adopted by left-leaning a nd
right-leaning governments (Huber et al. 2006; Pribble, Huber, and Stephens
2009; Castiglioni 20osa; Murillo 2005, 2002; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo
2001; Blafield 2012).
This study builds on both of these bodies of literature, but improves a nd
refines the arguments by focusing not only on ideology, but also on the organizational structure and predominant linkage mechanism employed by parties. This focus on overall party character, which I define as the combination
of ideology, internal organization, and external linkage mechanism, is inn~vative and bridges two bodies of political science research that have, until
now, remained separated. Specifically, I argue that the internal organization
of political parties, particularly the strength of the tie between elites and base
organizations, in combination with the party's ideology and the predominant
linkage mechanism employed to appeal to the core constituency, has a profound effect on the timing and content of social policy reform. The classification of party character developed in Chapter 2 identifies four party types:
constituency-coordinating, electoral-professional, charismatic-movement, and
non-programmatic-electoral, which exist on both sides of the ideological
spectrum. u Each of the party types influences the content of social policy
reform by determining the distribution of power inside the party and shaping
what kinds of policy initiatives are likely to be pursued.
The theoretical framework also builds on extant literature that emphasizes
the causal impact of previous policy design, or policy legacies. 12 I confirm the
10

11
12

I experimented with weighing some dimensions of the measure more heavily than others, but
the overall scores were not generally affected, and therefore, I decided to count each dimension
equally in an effort to increase the transparency of the measure.
These distinctions are discussed at great length in Chapter 2.
The concept of policy legacies was first developed by Pierson (1994); Esping-Andersen (199o);
and Huber and Stephens (2001).
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importance of these legacies, finding evidence that they influence the nature of
social policy reforms in Latin America. This is because policy legacies shape
the distribution of power and interests inside distinct policy sectors. This distribution, in turn, determines the costs and benefits that politicians face when
attempting to reform existing programs, and therefore shapes the content of
social policy initiatives.
The third and final variable that I argue influences the design of social policy
reform is the nature of electoral competition. I find that electoral competition
shapes policy reforms through two mechanisms. First, in a setting where electoral competition is intense, parties face incentives to carry out reforms that
appeal to a broad sector of society. In addition to the intensity of competition,
I argue that it is also important to consider where on the political spectrum
that competition is located. Specifically, left-leaning parties that face intense
competition from the right might be pushed to enact relatively centrist reforms
in order to attract moderate voters. Similarly, when parties of the right face
intense competition from the left, they may carry out reforms that expand state
involvement in an effort to appeal to a wider range of voters.
I hypothesize that each of the three variables included in my argument are
necessary causes of social policy reform and interact equally to determine the
outcome. This is not to say that party character, electoral competition, and
policy legacies are the only factors that shape social policy reforms. Indeed, a
number of other variables, including economic performance, civil society mobilization, international pressure, and political-institutional design, also influence
the design of policy outputs. Still, I contend that these effects are secondary to
the impact of party character, electoral competition, and policy legacies.
Existing Explanations of Latin American Social Policy Reform

The theoretical framework developed and tested in this book builds on a large
and rich body of scholarship that explores causal determinants of Latin American social policy. In general terms, existing explanations have focused on economic and political-institutional variables. As demonstrated in Chapters 3-7,
many of these factors also influenced recent social policy reforms in Argentina,
Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The evidence presented in the case studies,
however, suggests that, although important, these variables were secondary
causal factors. In this way, the key variables analyzed in this book - policy
legacies, electoral competition, and party character - worked in combination
with several other factors to produce the given social policy outputs.
Economic Explanations: Globalization and Growth

Globalization, or the increased flow of goods, capital, people, and ideas across
national borders, has been cited by many authors as an important determinant
of variation in social spending levels (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008;
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Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001) and in the desi_gn
of social protection systems (Rudra 2008; Brooks 2009; Dion 2010). Specifically, some have argued that foreign direct investment can result in a "race _to
the bottom" with regard to labor standards, tax codes, and subsequently social
protection systems (McKenzie and Lee 1991). Globalization may also influe~ce
social policy decisions because of the pressure that policy makers face to mai~tain the confidence of international investors (Brooks 2009). Upholding t~is
trust requires governments to avoid deficits, which in turn may result in social
spending cuts. In the case of Chile and Uruguay, my interviews turned up no
evidence that these pressures influenced social policy formation. Instead, wh~n
I questioned elites about the motivation for maintaining balanced budgets (,~
the case of the Concertaci6n and FA governments) or for engaging in deficit
spending (in the case of the Colorado and Blanco governments), the reasons
cited were tied to domestic political pressures and party preferences (Personal
Interviews #r, 3,'4, 6, ro, 17, 18, 20, 21, 36, 43, 55, 66, 68, 69, 92).
.
A final way that globalization is thought to influence social policy formati?n
is through the involvement of external actors, namely international financial
institutions (IFis), in the policy-making process. The role of IFis during the
current neoliberal era has been significant, with institutions such as the World
Bank (WB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) making sizable loans to countries for the purposes
of economic stabilization and structural adjustment. The loan process provides
IFis with the leverage to encourage reforms of a particular type by means of
conditionality. For this reason, some studies find that the involvement of IFis
can influence the nature of social policy reforms (Madrid 2003; Lakin 2oo6;
Nelson 1999).
In the case of Chile and Uruguay, while IFis have been involved in policy
making, it does not appear that these organizations were able to decisively shape
the content of reform packages. Even in the midst of Uruguay's devastating
2002 financial crisis, the country was able negotiate spending protections for ~11
social sectors with the IADB and the WB, allowing the state to maintain social
expenditure at pre-crisis levels. An official from the government of Colorado
President Jorge Batlle (2000-2005) told me that obtaining these guarantees
required tough negotiations, but that ultimately they were able to extract the
guarantees (Personal Interview #3 ). Similarly in Chile, despite the use of WB
loans, an official from the Aylwin and Frei governments told me: "[T]he long
and the short of it is that there was a great deal of symmetry in the relationship
with the World Bank. They didn't force anything on us and couldn't force
anything on us" (Personal Interview #28).
This comment was echoed by other policy makers, one of whom reminded
me that many representatives of the Chilean state are consultants for the WB
and do not feel pressured by the so-called Washington technocrats (Personal
Interview #79). Thus, while IFis provided proposals for policy design, it does
not appear that these organizations were able to force the adoption of those
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reforms. An alternative interpretation of the IFI argument would suggest that
the low level of IMF and World Bank involvement in Chile and Uruguay
might help explain the ability of those two states to pursue more universalistic
reforms. Such an explanation, however, has a difficult time accounting for
variation across policy sectors inside the two cases. Moreover, IFI involvement
in Venezuela has also been low since President Chavez's turn toward more
radical policy in the early 2000s, but as discussed in Chapter 7, the left-leaning
government has nonetheless been slow to produce universalizing reforms.
Part of the reason why the influence of IFis appears weak in this analysis
could be related to the time period under consideration. The views of the WB
and other financial actors have moderated across time, and by the beginning of
the twenty-first century, many IFis had begun to stress the importance of social
investment (Ewig 2010, 59-92). In this way, the international context may
have become more favorable to universalizing social policy by the early 2000s,
thereby making this explanation less relevant than it was during the 1980s
and early 1990s. Several studies of Latin American social policy formation
find evidence that the international diffusion of ideas and policy models is a
crucial determinant of policy outputs (Weyland 2004b; Madrid 2003; Martinez
Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea 2012). Thus, it stands to reason that the
renewed international interest in social investment could have helped promote
more universalistic social policy. This shift in the international context and the
prominent policy models, however, cannot explain why some Latin American
states pursued social policy reforms that expanded universalism, whereas others
did not.
Another economic argument related to social policy formation is exemplified by the common belief that economic growth is the most effective form of
welfare. Because the ability of governments to expand social policy programs
is closely tied to tax revenue, which in turn fluctuates with economic cycles,
studies have rightly noted that economic performance has important effects
on the scope of social protection systems (Foxley 2010). Moreover, periods of
economic crisis and austerity can undermine social safety nets, as governments
are forced to cut spending. Since the early 2000s, Latin America has experienced a relative economic boom, thanks in part to a favorable export market.
Indeed, the average growth rates for Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela
between 2003 and 2010 were 6.62 percent, 3.99 percent, 5.31 percent, and
5.01 percent, respectively. 1 3 These solid growth levels have undoubtedly facilitated the expansion of social spending during this same period. Still, while
strong and stable economic growth may have helped boost social spending, it
could not guarantee that these increases would respond to the needs of society's
most vulnerable groups and move policy design in a more universal direction.
'J

This average was calculated using data from _the Worl_d Bank (2012). I use 2003 as the base
year to avoid the dramatic declines witnessed 10 Argentma, Uruguay, and Venezuela as a result
of the

2001

financial crisis.
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In the case of Chile and Uruguay, the fact that the two countries' progre~s
toward universalism has varied across policy sectors casts doubt on the ro ~
of economic growth as a key determinant of universalism. Indeed, if gro~t h
were a direct cause of universalism, then one would expect that Chile, whic
has experienced the most sustained growth of the four countries, should have
gone significantly further than Uruguay toward achieving universalism, but
this was not the case. 14 Moreover, if this argument were true, one would h~ve
expected Chile to make the bulk of its progress toward universalism dunn~
the high-growth governments of President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) an_
President Eduardo Frei (1994-2000 ). Interestingly, however, Chile's most decisive reforms toward greater universalism were carried out during the slowergrowth administrations of President Lagos and President Bachelet. 15 Th~s,
while growth is an important contextual factor, and while the commodity
. r
boom of the early 2000s undoubtedly helped the move toward greater u~ive salism, it does not adequately explain variation across the Argentine, Chilean,
Uruguayan, and Venezuelan cases.
Political-Institutional Variables

A second group of variables that have been found to influence the format~on
and change of social policy in Latin America are political in nature, relau?g
to political regime type, the design of state institutions, and the role of parties
and interest groups. The first of these political-institutional arguments focu~e~
on the impact of democratic and authoritarian rule. Several studies of socia
policy expansion and reform in Latin America find that democratic st ates
tend to invest more in social welfare programs (Haggard and Kaufman 2008 ;
McGuire 2010; Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Brown and Hunter 1999;
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001) and that this spending tends to be mor~
egalitarian than that of authoritarian regimes (Huber et al. 2006). The bulk O f
research about the effects of democracy on social policy focuses on the role 0
electoral competition, which forces politicians to respond to citizen dema nd s
and increase social expenditure. McGuire (2010, 7-11) highlights other facets
of democracy that may influence social policy design, especially in the he~~th
sector. In particular, he notes that increased access to information, the ability
to form advocacy groups, and increased attention to equal rights foster _an
environment conducive to the expansion of basic health services. Other studies,
however, question the impact of democracy on social spending, noting that the
effect of political regime is mixed because democracy may empower privileged

14

Chile's growth rates have been positive in all but two years between 1990 an<l 2010, according to
the World Bank (2012). The country's average growth rate between 1990 and 2010 was 5·0.3
compared to 4.29%, 3.14 %, and 3 % for Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela, respective Y
(World Bank 2012; calculation by the author).
Chile's average growth rate between 1990 and 1999 was 6.38%. By contrast, the aver 3 ge
growth rate between 2000 and 2009 was 3.67% (World Bank 2012; calculations by the author).

o/l,
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interest groups and promote poor policy design (Keefer 2009; Nelson 2007).
All four countries in this study were democratic throughout the whole period
of the analysis, 16 and the case studies presented in Chapters 3-7 reveal that
one key element of democracy - the intensity of electoral competition - does
have an important effect on the design of social policy reform.
Perhaps the most widely cited institutional arguments about welfare state
development and change focus on the design of political institutions and the
impact of veto points (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008; Castiglioni 200 5a).
In particular, Castiglioni (20op) finds that variation in the extent to which
institutions concentrate political power helps explain differences in social policy outcomes in Chile and Uruguay between 1973 and 1998. I disagree with
Castiglioni with regard to the importance of institutional variables. Specifically,
I contend that the effect of veto points on social policy outputs is less significant
than my three variables of interest: party character, electoral competition, and
policy legacies.
The literature highlights three institutional veto points that are important
in dispersing political power: federalism, bicameralism, and referenda. For the
cases of Chile and Uruguay, the causal importance of federalism and bicameralism can be discounted, because both countries are unitary states with bicameral
legislatures. While both cases of slow progress analyzed in this book-Argentina
and Venezuela - are federal states, there is no evidence that the shared outcome was related to the countries' institutional design. In fact, some scholars
argue that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's efforts to centralize power
have all but eliminated subnational autonomy in contemporary Venezuela
(Corrales and Penfold 2011). All of this suggests that something other than
federalism or bicameralism is driving variation in the character of social policy
reforms.
The cases in this analysis do vary with regard to the presence of mechanisms of direct democracy (i.e., referenda and popular initiative), with Uruguay
and Venezuela exhibiting this institutional characteristic while the other states
do not. Since Uruguay's return to democracy, the use of referenda has had
important consequences for national politics (Altman 2011 ), and there is some
evidence that the institutional mechanism did indirectly affect social policy
making in that country. 1 7 In interviews with political elites, however, I was
consistently told that the ability to use the referenda mechanism is not equally
plausible for all parties. Members of the three largest Uruguayan parties noted
that the FA was particularly effective at calling for referenda. A deputy from
Uruguay's Independent Party put it clearest, stating:
16

The nature of Venezuela's political regime is a subject of intense debate. Freedom House
scores Venezuela as "partly free," whereas Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are scored as "free"
(Freedom House 2012). Thus, while the Venezuelan regime has moved toward autocratic
tendencies, it has not yet been classified as "not free."
1 7 The only successful use of the mechanism in association with social policy was the 1989 popular
initiative that resulted in a guarantee that pensions would be increased at the same time and to
the same magnitude as state workers' wages (Filgueira 199 5 ).
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It's not the referenda mechanism on its own that was powerful. It was that rule in
combination with the fact that FA was in opposition .... In fact, I would go so far as to
say that with the exception of the 1989 initiative, without the FA there wouldn't have
been any other referenda. (Personal Interview #9 r)

This point was also made by FA legislators and suggests the institutional rule
did not have a direct effect on policy output, but instead influenced outcomes
by means of the FA's constituency-coordinating character. In this way, the role
of the referenda in shaping social policy complements the argument presented
in this book, illustrating yet another way in which the FA's party character
influenced policy outputs.
.
Another institutional variable that has been found to influence social policy formation is the design of a country's electoral system (Iverson 2005). The
countries in this study differ with regard to the design of electoral rules, and the
variation, while not a direct cause of universalism, does shed light on the policymaking process in each country. Specifically, Chile's binomial electoral system,
which makes it difficult for a party to win both seats in any given congressional
district, has traditionally resulted in an overrepresentation of the parties of the
right (Carey 1997). The institutional design has also encouraged the formation
of political coalitions. This marks an important difference between Chile and
Uruguay, namely that the Concertaci6n is a coalition of center and left parties,
whereas the FA is one party. This, in turn, influences social policy formati~n
in each country, introducing additional obstacles in Chile that do not ex 1st
in Uruguay. A second institutional characteristic that influenced social policy
formation in Chile was the designated senator rule, which existed until 20°5
and granted special representation to the parties of the right. These two characteristics of Chile's political institutional design influenced policy formation by
constraining the institutional and partisan powers of the president, forcing the
left/center-left Concertaci6n to negotiate with the opposition and with coalition
partners (Castiglioni 2005a). My analysis confirms that these institutional rules
had some impact on social policy formation in Chile, but I find these effects to
be minor in comparison to party character, electoral competition, and policy
legacies. Specifically, institutional design cannot explain why the Concertaci6n
governments of the r99os and 2000s excelled in some policy domains, but not
in others. It also fails to explain why the parties of the right were effective at
opposing some initiatives, but had less of an effect on others. This variation
is more thoroughly explained by party character, electoral competition, a nd
policy legacies.
Uruguay also has a peculiar electoral system, which provides for double
simultaneous vote (the right to select both a party and a specific list) and
proportional representation. 18 Both of these mechanisms help explain the
fractionalized character of the country's political parties (Pineiro and Yaffe
18

The 1996 electoral reform eliminated double-simultaneous-vote for the president by requiring
parties to select one presidential candidate per party through primary elections.
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2003). 19 Castiglioni (2005a) argues that the fractionalization of Uruguay's
party system has resulted in greater power dispersion, which slowed efforts
at retrenchment. By contrast, I argue that party fractionalization has had an
indirect effect on social policy by influencing the organizational structure of
the parties. In particular, I contend that the fractionalization of Uruguay's parties is one of the contributing factors to the FA's constituency-coordinating
structure because the high level of internal competition provides incentives to
political elites to maintain strong ties to base organizations and work to expand
territorial presence. In this way, institutional design has influenced the process
of social policy reform in Chile and Uruguay, but I contend that its effects
are minor in comparison to party character, electoral competition, and policy
legacies.
A final group of theories of social policy reform focus on the role of political
parties, political leadership, unions, and interest groups in shaping the nature
of reform efforts (Huber and Stephens 2012; Grindle 20046; Lloyd-Sherlock
2004; Grindle 2004a; Nelson 2004; Kaufman and Nelson 2004c; Dion 2010;
Madrid 2003; Brooks 2009; Castiglioni 2005a; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo
2001; Segura-Ubiergo 2007; Haggard and Kaufman 2008). Since the 1980s,
Latin American political elites have faced an economic and social policy-making
environment characterized by significant constraints. The neoliberal doctrine,
which stresses downsizing the role of the state, scaling back social spending,
and deregulating markets, has placed new political pressure on policy makers
(Williamson 1990). Globalization has also influenced the policy-making environment, as countries must compete on the international playing field and foster
the confidence of international investors (Campello 2011; Brooks 2009; Rudra
2002). Political parties in general, but particularly those of the left/center-left,
which historically defended a state-led development model and publicly provided social protection, have been hard-hit by these international and domestic
constraints. In addition to the pressure to shift their traditional policy positions,
parties of the left/center-left have suffered as labor market flexibilization, trade
liberalization, and the decline in public sector employment have resulted in a
weakening of unions, the core constituency of the parties, both in terms of
overall numbers and general political power (Weyland 2004a; Roberts 20026;
Portes and Hoffman 2003; Dion 2010; Kurtz 2004).
As a result of these constraints, some scholars have argued that ideological differences between parties of the left and right have become increasingly
small (Weyland 2004a). In this vein, some studies show that populist parties
of the left/center-left have recently engaged in regressive social policy reforms
(Madrid 2003; Kaufman and Nelson 2004a; Brooks 2009), whereas parties
of the right/center-right have carried out progressive reforms in at least one
case (Lakin 2006). These studies conclude, therefore, that party differences on
'9

To date, leadership within the FA has been quite fluid, with different fractions growing and
declining in distinct moments (Pifieiro and Yaffe 2003 ).
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matters of social policy are relatively unimportant. Still, a growing body of
research finds that parties of the left and right vary with regard to how they
design regulatory, labor, and social policy (Huber et al. 2006; Pribble, Huber,
and Stephens 2009; Castiglioni 2oop; Murillo 2005, 2002; Kaufman and
Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Blafield 2012). I contend that these seeming inconsistencies in research findings result from the fact that debate about the impact of
partisanship on policy outcomes has remained separate from research on political party organization and linkage mechanisms, and that to fully understand
the process of social policy reform, one must consider the overall character of a
party, which I define as the combination of ideology, internal organization, and
linkage mechanism. Indeed, while ideology does make a difference with regard
to the general priorities of a party, that orientation is not always translated
into corresponding actions, and I contend that such discrepancies result from
variation in party organization and linkage mechanism. Thus, political parties do influence social policy formation in Latin America, but to understand
their effect, one must disaggregate the concept of party into three dimensions:
ideology, organizational structure, and linkage mechanism.
In addition to political parties, several studies of Latin American social
policy focus on the role of unions and other interest groups in shaping the content and success of reform initiatives (Lloyd-Sherlock 2004; Grindle 20046,
2004a; Kaufman and Nelson 2004c; Nelson 2007, 1999, 2000). The bulk of
these studies find that labor unions have tended to resist reforms to education,
health, and pension policy, and that, even when approved, the actors have
often blocked effective implementation. Other research, however, finds that
labor unions have not always been hostile to progressive social policy reforms
and have even, on occasion, embraced efforts to expand protection to previously marginalized sectors of the population (Niedzwiecki 2010; Huber and
Stephens 2012). I contend that this disagreement in the literature results from
the fact that many studies focus directly on union behavior rather than analyzing the broader context in which labor unions formulate their preferences.
In particular, I argue that the design of previous policy, or policy legacies, is
crucial for understanding whether or not labor unions and other organized
interest associations will support a given policy reform. In this way, the design
of previous policy can either facilitate or inhibit the passage of policy reform
by shaping the preferences of potential veto actors.
Method, Research Design, and Case Selection

The pages that follow provide a process-oriented account of social policy
reform in Chile and Uruguay, with a secondary focus on Argentina and
Venezuela. The study employs the qualitative method of process tracing to
test my theoretical assumptions, drawing on original interview data from more
than 135 in-depth interviews with political elites in Chile and Uruguay. I also
analyze archival data gathered from an extensive study of press and legislative
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reports. In the shadow case analysis of social policy reform in Argentina and
Venezuela, I rely on secondary source information. Small-N qualitative studies are sometimes criticized for violating the norms of statistical research and
for the inherent limits on the generalizability of findings (King, Keohane, and
Verba 1994). Still, a growing body of scholarship has emphasized the important strengths of qualitative research, namely its ability to test causal processes and probe a theory's internal validity (George and Bennett 2005; Goertz
and Mahoney 2012; Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004). Specifically, these
authors argue that qualitative methods provide unique leverage in establishing causal inference because the studies analyze "causal process observations"
rather than "dataset observations" (Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004, 252264). Causal process observations, they note, are within-case observations
that provide insight into how a relationship unfolded. Typically, scholars use
these observations to carry out process tracing, which allows for two types of a
hypothesis test: hoop tests and smoking-gun tests (Goertz and Mahoney 2012).
This study employs process tracing to carry out a series of hoop tests that assess
whether the causal sequence outlined in Chapter 2 actually played out in the
manner that I have specified. A hoop test proposes that particular pieces of
evidence must be present within a given case in order for the hypothesis to be
confirmed (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). In Chapter 2, I highlight a series of
expectations that identify such evidence. To perform these hoop tests, I draw on
hundreds of causal process observations, revealing precisely how party character, electoral competition, and policy legacies influenced social policy reforms
in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The study focuses primarily on
within-case variation, and I provide multiple probes of the hypotheses, analyzing thirty-seven failed and successful reforms in three policy sectors inside each
case. Thus, while the number of cases analyzed in this book is relatively small
(four), the number of causal process observations is large, thereby allowing for
a rigorous test of the hypotheses.
Because the focus of this book is to assess whether party character, electoral
competition, and policy legacies influenced social policy reform by means of the
mechanisms specified in the next chapter, I select four cases that provide wide
variation on these independent variables. The analysis of each of the four cases
explores the mechanisms that link party character, electoral competition, and
policy legacies to distinct types of social policy reform. Thus, I select Argentina,
Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela because they each represent a different type of
party, display divergent levels of electoral competition, and exhibit distinct
policy legacies.
I focus on Chile and Uruguay as my primary cases of analysis for two
reasons. First, Chile and Uruguay are similar in many regards, but exhibit
interesting variation on the three key variables addressed by this study: policy legacies, electoral competition, and party character. In particular, Chile
and Uruguay have very comparable levels of economic development, reaching per capita GDP levels of US$rr,999.24 and US$rr,069.14, respectively,
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in 2009 (Penn World Table 20rr). The two countries also exhibit sim~lar
records of democracy, strong political institutions, high levels of state capacity,
and institutionalized political parties. Moreover, both Chile and Uruguay are
unitary states with low levels of ethnic and racial diversity. The two countries differ, however, with regard to policy legacies, electoral competition, and
party character. Whereas Chile underwent a process of radical privatizat! 0 ~
in education, health care, and pension policy, Uruguay continues to exhib_it
heavy state involvement in all social sectors except health care. Moreover, Ill
Chile, the ruling left/center-left Concertaci6n governments faced intense electoral competition from the right side of the political spectrum throughout the
entire period of this analysis. By contrast, in Uruguay, the right/center-right
Colorado and Blanco governments of the r99os and early 2000s faced intense
electoral competition from the left/center-left FA. However, in 2004, when
the FA assumed office, the left-leaning party faced weak electoral competition
because of the Colorado's precipitous decline. With regard to party character, Chile's left/center-left parties are electoral-professional in nature, whereas
Uruguay's left/center-left Frente Amplio is a constituency-coordinating partf •
Similarly, one of Chile's conservative parties, the Independent Democratic
Union (UDI), is a constituency-coordinating organization, whereas Uruguay's
traditional (right/center-right) parties exhibit an electoral-professional stru~ture. In this way, Chile and Uruguay provide clear contrasts on the key vanables in my framework, and therefore are the two primary cases analyzed in
the book.
I also chose to focus on Chile and Uruguay because the two countries have
been among the most successful states in the region in advancing toward
universalism. 20 In this way, they provide fertile territory for understanding
how Latin American states have begun to move toward more inclusive welfare policy. Progress in Chile and Uruguay, however, has been neither perfect
nor uniform. In Chile, movement toward universalism is most evident in the
domain of pension policy, with notable advancement in health care and more
moderate improvement in education. In Uruguay, impressive progress occurred
in the domain of family allowances, with important achievements in health care
policy but little improvement in education.
The inclusion of Argentina and Venezuela in a less detailed shadow analysis is instructive, as it provides greater variation on one of my key independent variables: political party character. Indeed, Argentina and Venezuela
exhibit levels of economic development that are similar to Chile and Uruguay,
with a GDP per capita of US$rr,96r.40 and US$9,rr 5.39, respectively, Ill
2009 (Penn World Table 2orr), but the two countries vary with rega rd
to party character. In particular, both Argentina and Venezuela have been
2

°

Costa Rica historically has had the most universalistic welfare state in the region (Martinez
Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea 2012). The country, however, varies from Chile and Uruguay
with regard to its historical trajectory, thereby making a controlled comparison difficult.
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governed by a non-programmatic-electoral party of the left/center-left: the Peronist Party (PJ) in Argentina and the Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and
Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) in Venezuela. 2 ' Critics may wonder why I
selected Argentina and Venezuela rather than Brazil and Bolivia - two countries with well-known left/center-left parties that have made advancement in
the domain of social policy. While I do discuss both of these cases in the conclusion of the book, it did not make good theoretical sense to include them in
this analysis for two reasons. In the case of Brazil, the left-leaning Workers'
Party (PT) exhibits a party character similar to Chile's Concertacion parties
at the national level and an organization reminiscent of Uruguay's FA at the
local level. Thus, inclusion of Brazil would not provide greater variation with
regard to my primary variable of interest: party character. While Bolivia would
provide a fourth party type, the country exhibits a dramatically different level
of economic development than that of Chile and Uruguay, which makes a
structured comparison very difficult.
Although Argentina and Venezuela are both federal states, I focus on
national-level policy initiatives. While subnational variation likely exists in
both countries, with certain states or provinces exhibiting better coverage and
service quality than others, universalism requires that all citizens, regardless
of geographic location, have access to a minimum standard of protection.
Such minimum standards are typically enforced through federal mandates, and
therefore I focus my attention on national-level policy formation.
The research design utilized in this book, therefore, provides for a stringent
test of the hypotheses. The causal process observations utilized to assess the
internal validity of the theoretical framework provide systematic evidence of
the mechanisms that link party character, electoral competition, and policy
legacies to reform outcomes. In this way, the study is an example of how
qualitative methods can be effectively used for a particular type of hypothesis
testing. The book, therefore, makes an important contribution to the growing
literature about the logic of qualitative social science inquiry.
Although qualitative analyses have many strengths, they are unable to adequately assess the external validity of a theory because of the difficulty of
generalizing from such a small number of cases (Collier, Brady, and Seawright
2004). In light of this limitation, it is important to clearly delineate the boundary conditions of this argument. The theoretical framework established in this
book does not seek to provide a grand theory of policy reform that can be
generalized to all corners of the globe for all periods of time. Rather, I seek
to explain a small population of countries, namely Latin America's advanced
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As mentioned previously, the PSUV is located further to the left than other parties in the analysis,
but for reasons of parsimony I choose to group left and center-left parties into one category. I
also recognize that the PJ is not a traditional left/center-left party, but rather tends to exhibit
ideological flexibility, sometimes being led by left-leaning elites and other times reflecting more
conservative tendencies.
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social protection states, during the 1990s and 2ooos. 22 These countries include
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
This book is organized into three parts. In the first part (Chapters r and 2), I
develop a theoretical framework that seeks to explain patterns of social policy
reform in contemporary Latin America. In the second part (Chapters 3, 4, 5,
and 6), I use process tracing to analyze successful and failed attempts to reform
health care, noncontributory social assistance, and education policy in Chile
and Uruguay since each country's transition to democracy. I also describe how
political parties in each country evolved and why they consolidated distinct
organizational characteristics. In the final part (Chapters 7 and 8), I employ a
structured comparison to assess the capacity of my theoretical framework to
explain successful and failed policy reforms in two secondary cases: Argentina
and Venezuela. I conclude with a reflection about the book's main findings,
highlighting important theoretical and practical implications of the study.

22

Thi~ temporal focus is important because the global economic context shifted significantlY
durmg the e~r.ly 200 0~, as many Latin American states began to enjoy a favorable export
ma:ket .. A?dmonally, mternational financial institutions and the policy community altered
thetr thmkmg about the role of the state in providing social services and transfers.

